Page 45 - TheGoldBug1969-70

:";:: . THE GOLD BUG DECEMBER 12, 1969 PAGE 5 Collision Course--*.,....- Collision Course was presented from December 3- 6 in Understage. The twelve plays were seen by about eighty people each night. Those who came to the play were not to be entertained, but rather to be vomited on. The vomit was composed of small pieces of thoroughly digested ideas and images. Brief glimpses of various situations, (sometimes absurd, sometimes only wear- ing a cover of absurdity), gave the viewer a good look through a machine-gun barrel at himself pulling the trigger. Review by Jim Smyth Max Dixon's first directing effort at Western Maryland was particularly appropriate for the college, (where non-communication is present in the form of a "silent majori4L,..:.). Short plays like Thoughts on the Instant of Greeting a Friend on the Street show- ed that what is usually left unsaid is more meaningful than the customary patterns of semi-speech into which we often fall. The goal of Collision Course did not seem to be to make us more sensitive, (groovy, relevant, aware, co- mmitted, far-out, etc.), but to let us see, through a magnifying glass, the way things are or will soon be. The cast of Blair, Grant, Harris, Horn, Kline, Trott, Whitney, and Wil- liams, without the aid of a sophisti- cated set, relied entirely on their bod- ies and voices to force their characters and their emotions into the heads in the audience. They successfully "turn- ed the key" for many of the viewers, and gave the finger to others. If you missed Collision Course, perhaps you should settle for a small, airtight, steel Photos by Larry Sanders box filled to the top with your favo- rite confection . . :: -Clearing the Air About Objectives-- In the few years past since 1964 there has been an An analysis of our Vietnam Policy ass the guerrilla. This tactic keeps the guerrilla off Increase In awareness and a growing condemnation of balance, making it difficult for his units to rest and train our Intervention and subsequent efforts in South Viet- by John Love and 11also prevents him from going on the offense to any nam. While there is, no doubt, a sincere beUef on _the great extent. To be done correctly this offensive polley part of the war critics that their cause is just, I feel at relatively little expense and protracted almost indef- requires a large number of troops and/or great mobility. that these people have not wholly examined all the issues initely due to its extremely versatile nature. According Because it Is necessary to maintain a policy of continual Involved and therefore have arrived at conclusions dis- to Mao Tee-bung (who, along with Vo Nguyen Giap, pre- attack the government must be able to have or place a torted by thlslackofknowledge.ltls the purpose of these sently North Vietnamese Minister of Defense, Is prob- superior force in attack positions near any guerrilla unit articles to present what I consroar to be facts and ideas ably ,the world's foremost strategist in this area and who at all times. (Hence in the early fifties the workable, relevant to the issue, so that each individual can, if he rs responsible for reducing this type of warfare to a re- necessary ratio of government troops to guerrillas was desires, form his opinions on a base cr diverstned know- fined technique) there are tour phases in the growth of a 10:1; today, due to the great mobility provided by the helt- ledge. guerrilla movement. The first phase: political subver , copter, this figure has been reduced to 6:1). Properly To my knowledge It Is not, nor has It been, U. S. policy ston. In this stage the insurgents infiltrate trade and pursued this policy constantly forces the guerrilla to stand to "win" the war In Vietnam __lf by "win" one speaks of labor unions, civic organizatons, political parties, etc. and fight or retreat. If heflghts, then due to the mobility winning in the pre-Korean war sense. Beforethe Korean and create as much unrest and confusion as possible. This and SUperior firepower of the government forces, hewiU war a nation, or at least a major power, went to war with makes it difficult for the government to function property; be defeated. If he retreats he cannot take the offensive one objective: to completely destroy its enemy's ability and popular unrest and support for the movement grows, and even inthistypeofwaraprolonged defense leads only to resist--thatwaswinning. ButwUh the advent of nuclear The second phase: terrorist activities. When the move- to defeat. So destroyed, perhaps over anumber of years, weapons, to win a war In the old sense would mean des- ment feels that it has enough support It gathers recruits militarily must turn to his political base-r-the people, Now troying the world, which no one could consider winning in for sporadic, small unit attacks on police stations, gov- the problem becomes one of political warfare. Thispolltl- any sense of the word. So there developed the concept of ernment outposts, factories, unpopular institutions, etc. cal reconversion of the people is, perhaps, the more diffi- limited warrare-cwar no longer necessitated destroying and for extortion and kidnapping of officials. The third cult aspect of thewar.Itlsmoredlfficult because in most the enemy but rather was concerned with achieving certain phase: Irregular military operations. With an Increase cases the guerrillas and the people which support them preconceived objectives. Objectives can encompass in unrest, recruits and supplies (stolen from the govern- harbor some resentment, usually legitimate, toward the "almost" goals such as holding certain areas of land (as ment or from outside sources) permanent base camps government if the guerrilla movement is in the minority in Korea), securing bargaining points (the Sinai in the Mid- can be established in friendly areas. From these base then only constitutional measures can be used to solve East) or reductng the enemy's ability to wage aggressive camps the guerrillas, now operating in larger units, can their problems; since any more far reaching actions would warfare. Therefore when a nation has achieved Its objec- extend their operations and control over ever larger ar- alienate the majority. A movement of the majority is tives It has won a limited war. eas, while at the same time doing everything possible to much more difficult to deal with. Everything possIble When we entered the war in Vietnam we decided, for wIn the populace to their side. The fourth phase: con- must be done to regain their favor; which policy presum- reasons of expediency and due to the nature of the Viet- sol1dation. As the guerrilla movement grows stronger ably would demand governmental-constitutional reform. Minh-French conflict, to continue the war In a stmtfartv and the government grows weaker, the guerrillas form Militarily we are making several mistakes. Due to the l1mited manner; so we established objectives. 'I'hese ob- larger, more conventionally organized, military units lack of adequate troops (adequate in terms of both train- [ecttves were and still are: 1) to protect the populace, and begin to fight regular (as opposed to hit and run) bat- ing and numbers) we are relying too heavily on our and Us property when feasfble, from People's Army of tles with the government forces. This stage continues superior firepower to merely maintain a viable defensive North VIetnam-National Liberation Front (hereafter until the guerrillas become a regular army, superior to position. And while defensive/operational bases are im- P AVN-NLF) domination so that 2)the people may partici- and finally victorious over the government forces. The portant, a maintalnence of this policy must be subordin- pate, without Interference, in the governmental process beauty of this type of warfare lies In the great flexibility ated to "search and destroy" missions tnwtuch the enemy and 3) so that this process can be manifested. To these it possesses: if at any stage the enemy proves too strong and his bases are put onthedefenslve. Our massive air- political ends we 4) exercise military force to the extent then the guerrillas Simply have to retrench in an earlier power Is being used primarily tactically and while it does that is necessary to remove the threat of external/ in- phase and .watt until the opposition Is weaker. It is a achieve the desired results they are inadequate. A poUcy ternal violent overthrow of the existing government. devastatingly simple poltcy ot expansion, development and of aggressive strategic bombing should, if concentrated on Accordingly the U.S. military Is not intent on destroying consolidation. the correct targets, seriously hamper the enemy's ability the ability to resist of the PAVN-NLF, but rather has As is 50 often the case, a problem which Is simple to to conduct operations which require complex logistics, been attempting to remove its ablIlty to wage aggressive create can be very difficult to solve and a guerrilla war that is reduce him to small unit tactics. It has been shown warfare. These are ourobjectives--throughstategy, tac- is no exception. However In recent years various coun- that the mere possession of land in this type of war does tics and political actions they are being accomplished; tries have successfully dealt with this problem and appro- not guarantee success to any degree. Yet, we continue although perhaps not to the extent we would like. aches to combatting guerrillas have been proven Inthese the tactic of engaging in costly battles to gain militarily Today, in light of the ideas about limited war men- campaigns (Greece 1946-1949, Malaya 1946-1955, PhiU- useless pieces of ground when we should be concentrat- tioned above, most nations are developing a guerrilla war- pplnes 1948-1955). TIme and again a static defense has ing our holding efforts on population centers. Nonethe- fare capacitity as either a primary or secondary response. been proven ineffective; therefore, whlle paying attention less, from this it can be seen that we are winning in the Guerrilla warfare Is particularly well adapted to nations to secure supply bases and population centers, the bulk of sense that we are achieving our objectives but we are with limited military resources for it can be supported combat troops must be used to conUnually attack and har-; doing it in such a manner that they are impermanent gains. Is it worth our errcrts to defend these gains?