Page 41 - Contrast1967November

postulates are absolutely imcompatible
and contradictory and so it is under-
standable why the opposition does not
come to the conference table, until
we admit our error and try to rectify
it. You know when an individual
admits error, we honor him for it,
but apparently it's more difficult
for a nation to do so."

And the most unnerving reaction to our
"willingness to negotiate" comes from some Viet-
namese themselves, "If the U.S. is determined to
defeat the Vietcong in order to protect South
Vietnam, why should it offer to negotiate?"

We all hope our government will become more
believable in its foreign policy statements.

It does not appear that there is appreciable
South Vietnamese support for our policy and action
there. One wonders just how long the Saigon
government would last if we were not underwriting
it. In 1965 there were 96,000 desertions from the
South Vietnamese army and in 1966, 110,000,
according to our official figures.

The Saigon regime has never had popular support
and the most recent election validates this. One
again suspects that the Vietnamese really do not
. '..vantthe form of government we desire for them and
one doubts whether Saigon is really interested in
fighting the Vietcong as we are. Are we fighting
for the South Vietnamese or are we imposing our
will on a people for fear their choice of govern-
ment will be more Asian than American?

As to the solution of the problem, an immediate
withdrawal from Vietnam would be impractical and
irresponsible given the present ineffectiveness
of the South Vietnamese government and the impov-
erishment of the country. But Schlesinger,
Fulbright, R. Kennedy, and others have suggested
viable alternatives. I suggest the following
which incorporates many of their suggestions.

--stop the bombing of the North immediately
and finally

--patiently seek and wait for negotiations
with all parties concerned including, and
especially, the Vietcong

--defensive holding action in the South
--an international police force to protect

the replacement of refugees and to ensure
a valid election of a civilian government
--a new Geneva Conference to do what we
failed to do in 1954